

possible. But even if the attribution to Lucilius is correct, far more care is necessary in interpreting the fragment. If *Lucretii* is correct, then it is at once clear that the comment of the scholiast is wrong: only part of the line, not the whole line as the scholiast says, is found in Lucretius. That is not an argument against the emendation. It does, however, suggest that the whole verse may not be from Lucilius either. Scholiasts are notorious for their exaggeration in the matter of literary dependence; a famous example, much discussed, is Servius' note on *Ecl.* 10. 46: "hi omnes uersus Galli sunt, de ipsius translati carminibus." There are many others; Jocelyn, who has collected a number of them, is pessimistic about their accuracy: "Where Macrobius or a scholiast preserves the text of both sides of a parallelism, in only two cases does Virgil appear to have copied as much as a whole hexameter verse from his alleged predecessor."¹¹ We are quite safe in assuming that the scholiast on Persius knew no more than Servius. If the scholium on Persius 1. 2 does refer to Lucilius, we still need not possess a line of Lucilius, merely a part of a line, or a similar line. "The truth is that the difficulties of the text of Lucilius are for the most part inexplicable and its corruptions for the most part irremediable. What more than anything else enables the critic and the commentator of an ancient author to correct mistakes and to elucidate obscurities is their context; and a fragment has no context." So Housman, in his review of Marx's edition.¹² What the reader of a fragmentary text needs always to remember is the precariousness of his knowledge. We will never know for certain whether Persius was alluding to Lucilius or Lucretius in his opening verse.¹³ But it seems most probable that the verse that he had in mind, whoever wrote it, was not the same as the verse now printed as fragment 9 of Lucilius.¹⁴

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11. H. D. Jocelyn, "Ancient Scholarship and Virgil's Use of Republican Latin Poetry, II," *CQ* 15 (1965): 142.

12. A. E. Housman, "Luciliana," *CQ* 1 (1907): 53 = *Classical Papers* (Cambridge, 1972), 2:662.

13. Certainly, even if the whole line could safely be ascribed to Lucilius, Marx's reconstruction of the setting based on a supposed parallel with the council of the gods in *Odyssey* 1. 32 is not acceptable; the two passages are simply not close enough, nor would *in rebus* (sc. *humanis*) be appropriate in the mouth of a god. Housman's criticism ("Luciliana," p. 73 = *Classical Papers*, 2:683) of Marx's remarkable ability to divine the context of Lucilian fragments was quite just.

14. I am grateful to Diana White for her criticisms and suggestions.

ARISTOTLE *EN* 10. 7. 1177b6–15

In Book 10 of the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle proves the superiority of the intellectual over the moral virtues by showing that only the former satisfy every criterion of *eὐδαιμονία*.¹ Intellectual activity, we read in 1177a12 ff., is (1) closest to the divine or the most divine in ourselves, (2) most continuous, (3) accompanied by the most exquisite joy (*ἡδονή*, a22 f.), (4) self-sufficient (a27 ff.), (5) desired for its own sake (1177b1 ff.), and (6) associated with leisure (*σχολή*, b4 ff.). We are ready to believe that Aristotle did not keep the arguments for the last two propo-

1. The criteria reflect commonly held opinions. Franz Dirlmeier in his admirable commentary (*Aristoteles Werke in deutscher Übersetzung*, ed. Ernst Grumach, vol. 6: "Nikomachische Ethik" [Berlin, 1960], p. 591) notes a particularly frequent use of *δοκεῖ* in this section. *οἰόμεθα* (a22) has the same function. Aristotle does not introduce any new standards of value.

sitions as strictly apart as logic would require;² but credulity is stretched to the breaking point if a sequence of thoughts as incoherent as the following is to dispose of the practical virtues and in particular to disqualify the statesman and the warrior: αἱ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις δοκοῦσιν ἀσχοιοεῖν εἶναι, αἱ μὲν πολεμικαὶ καὶ παντελῶς (οὐδεὶς γὰρ αἰρεῖται τὸ πολεμεῖν τοῦ πολεμεῖν ἕνεκα, οὐδὲ παρασκευάζει πόλεμον· δόξαι γὰρ ἂν παντελῶς μαιφόνος τις εἶναι, εἰ τοὺς φίλους πολεμίους ποιοῖτο, ἵνα μάχαι καὶ φόνοι γίγνωντο) (1177b7–12). Surely the entire parenthesis—and let us not forget that parentheses exist faute de mieux—is meant to exclude any thought of the πολεμικαὶ πράξεις as an end in themselves. Logic is satisfied if after καὶ παντελῶς we supply, e.g., <οὐδὲ ἐν αὐταῖς ἐστὶ τὸ τέλος> or <οὐδὲ ἐν αὐταῖς ἔχουσι τὸ τέλος>.³

Turning next to the statesman (b12) Aristotle makes the same two points: he lacks leisure and his actions are undertaken for ends other than themselves. This parallels the line of thought that we have reconstructed for the warrior.⁴

At 1177b16 ff. Aristotle recapitulates: εἰ δὴ τῶν μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πράξεων αἱ πολιτικαὶ καὶ πολεμικαὶ κάλλει καὶ μεγέθει προέχουσιν, αὐταὶ δ' ἀσχοιοεῖν καὶ τέλους τινὸς ἐφίενται καὶ οὐ δι' αὐτὰς αἰρεταὶ εἰσιν . . . (the activity of the mind is clearly superior in worth). The clauses here quoted summarize what has been said in b6–15, but in the text of these lines as transmitted in the MSS the *probanda* τέλους τινὸς ἐφίενται καὶ οὐ δι' αὐτὰς αἰρεταὶ εἰσιν are established only for political activities. To include warfare, the parenthesis of b9–12 must be given the function in the argument which the words themselves suggest and which logic requires.⁵

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2. This is probably the case in 1177b4 ff., where in a statement designed to prove the association of happiness and leisure (ἀσχοιούμεθα γὰρ ἵνα σχολάζωμεν, καὶ πολεμοῦμεν ἵν' εἰρήνην ἄγωμεν), the previously applied test ("desired for its own sake?") continues to be operative.

3. These supplements combine homoeoarcton and homoeoteleuton. Less would suffice, and a proposal like <οὐδὲ δι' αὐτὰς αἰρεταὶ εἰσιν> has the advantage of parallels close at hand in the text (see above). For the relationship between war and peace, being busy and having leisure, see also *Pol.* 7. 1333a30–b3, 7. 1334b2–10, and 8. 1337b26–1338a6.

4. Contrast the intellectual virtue which is held μόνῃ δι' αὐτὴν ἀγαπᾶσθαι (1177b1 ff.).

5. R. A. Gauthier and J. Y. Jolif in their commentary (*Aristote: "L'Ethique à Nicomache,"* vol. 2 [Paris–Louvain, 1959], p. 887) show that they are aware of the problem but their explanation ("pour prouver que les activités guerrières sont tout le contraire d'un loisir, A. montre donc qu'elles ne sont pas une fin") suggests mental operations too erratic for Aristotle, who is often elliptic but hardly ever illogical.

PUTTING PRESSURE ON PLUTARCH: PHILOSTRATUS *EPISTLE* 73

πέιθε δὴ καὶ σύ, ὦ βασιλεια, τὸν θαρσαλέωτερον τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Πλούταρχον μὴ ἀχθῆσθαι τοῖς σοφισταῖς, μηδὲ ἐς διαβολὰς καθίστασθαι τοῦ Γοργίου. εἰ δὲ οὐ πείθεις, σὺ μὲν, οἷα σου σοφία καὶ μῆτις, οἷσθα, τί χρὴ ὄνομα θέσθαι τῷ τοιῷδε, ἐγὼ δὲ εἰπεῖν ἔχω· οὐκ ἔχω [C. L. Kayser (ed.) *Flavii Philostrati Opera auctiora*, vol. 2 (Leipzig, 1871; repr. Hildesheim, 1968), p. 257]

The writer is allegedly Philostratus, addressing Julia Domna and telling her to persuade the long-deceased Plutarch to change his attitude. Either Philostratus is indulging in extravagant literary artifice, fully aware that Plutarch is dead; or the writer is a forger and a fool. Eduard Norden¹ had no difficulty in accepting

1. *Die antike Kunstprosa*² (Berlin, 1909; repr. Darmstadt, 1958), 1:381, n. 1.